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The state of Nevada passed legislation in 2009 that abolished deﬁciency judgments for purchase mort- 
gage loans made after October 1, 2009, and collateralized by primary single-family homes. In this paper, 
we study how this change in the law affected equilibrium mortgage lending. Using unique mortgage 
loan-level application data and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the qualiﬁcation crite- 
rion, we ﬁnd that the law change led to a decline in equilibrium loan sizes of about 1 to 2 percent. 
There exists some evidence that mortgage approval rates also decreased for the affected loan applica- 
tions. These results suggest that making the deﬁciency judgment law more default friendly in Nevada 
generated material cost on borrowers at the time of mortgage origination. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
In the United States, state laws govern residential mortgage de-
aults and house foreclosure processes. In most states, mortgage
oans are recourse loans – that is, lenders can apply the difference
etween mortgage balance and proceeds from foreclosure sales
o delinquent borrowers’ other assets or earnings, a process also
nown as deﬁciency judgments. 1 Theory predicts that recourse
hould deter default since default puts delinquent borrowers’ other
ssets at risk. 2 This prediction has prompted some discussion of
sing deﬁciency judgments to reduce mortgage defaults during the
ecent mortgage crisis. 3 , 4 Protections to defaulters in the form of
o deﬁciency judgments, however, can impose substantial costs on∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: wenli.li@phil.frb.org (W. Li), ﬂorian.oswald@sciencespo.fr 
(F. Oswald). 
1 See Table 1 in Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) for a summary of different state re- 
ourse laws. 
2 See, for example, Ambrose et al. (1997) , and Corbae and Quintin (2015) . 
3 See Adam Levitin’s blog post, “The Role of Recourse in Foreclosures,” at http: 
/www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/12/the-role-of-rec.html . 
4 The literature ﬁnds mixed evidence. For instance, Clauretie (1987) shows that 
hether a state allows for deﬁciency judgments does not affect mortgage default 
ates signiﬁcantly, consistent with the observation that deﬁciency judgments are 
ot carried out often in practice due to the high cost associated with pursuing them 
 Ambrose and Capone, 1996; Leland, 2008 , and Brueggeman and Jeffrey, 2011 ). By 
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094-1190/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. enders. If lenders try to recoup these costs by reducing approval
ates or restricting loan sizes, laws intended to protect homeown-
rs in distress may impose costs on all borrowers. 
In this paper, we conduct a unique event study using propri-
tary mortgage loan-level application data to test whether changes
n deﬁciency judgment laws affected mortgage loan approval rates
r approved mortgage loan sizes. In 2009, Nevada passed legis-
ation that made signiﬁcant changes to its deﬁciency judgment
aw. For homeowners who entered into a mortgage in conjunction
ith the purchase of a single-family primary home after October
, 2009, their mortgage lenders will not be able to pursue a deﬁ-
iency judgment if the house is taken in a foreclosure. Our analysis
s based on the difference-in-differences identiﬁcation that exploits
his qualiﬁcation criteria: ﬁrst-lien reﬁnance loans for primary res-
dences are not affected by the law change. Speciﬁcally, we assess
he differential change in the approval rates as well as approved
oan sizes of the treatment group (purchase loans) relative to the
ontrol group (reﬁnance loans) around the new law implementa-
ion date. The identiﬁcation assumption behind this comparison is
hat, in the absence of the legislative change, the approval rates
nd approved loan sizes in the control and treatment groups would
ollow similar patterns (up to a constant difference). ontrast, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) show that recourse affects default by lowering 
orrowers’ default sensitivity to negative equity and home value. 
2 W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 
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7 Clark County is by far the most populous county in Nevada (it contains Las 
Vegas). Loans in Clark County account for more than 75 percent of total mortgages 
in Nevada between 20 0 0 and 2013. We scraped the website of the Clark County 
District Court to obtain information on deﬁciency judgments contained in their case 
ﬁles. Information for the other counties were not easily accessible via the internet. 
8 We thank Yuan Yuan for her generous help in collecting this information. 
9 Quintin and Yuan (2015) ﬁnd in their study of foreclosure sales in seven coun- 
ties in Illinois between mid-2008 and mid-2012 that about 2 percent end up with 
a deﬁciency judgment. Over that period, our numbers are smaller. There are several 
possible reasons for this difference. First, our sample includes both liquidation and 
real-estate-owned mortgages. Using the liquidation sample, however, only raises the 
probability to about 0.3 percent. Second, deﬁciency judgment was no longer al- 
lowed against purchase mortgages for primary residences made after October 2009. 
Finally, households in Nevada might have fewer assets than households in Illinois, 
making deﬁciency judgment suits not appealing to lenders. 
10 Aside from recourse, in Nevada, lenders may foreclose on mortgages in default 
using either a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure process. The judicial process of Our analysis shows that the law change is associated with a de-
cline in approval rates of about 3 percent and in approved loan
sizes of about 1 to 2 percent for the affected purchase loans. As
a robustness check, we conduct additional experiments where we
use ﬁrst-lien purchase loans for primary residences from neigh-
boring counties in other states as our alternative control group.
Those states did not pass any signiﬁcant legislative changes con-
cerning foreclosure laws during our sample period. We continue to
ﬁnd that the equilibrium loan sizes declined for Nevada purchase
loans after its law change. Finally, we conduct a placebo test using
loans in counties that neighbor Nevada and that did not experi-
ence changes in deﬁciency judgment laws. There, we do not ﬁnd
any evidence of signiﬁcant changes in approval rates or loan sizes
for purchase loans after October 2009. 
Our paper joins the large literature that analyzes the impact of
various aspects of state laws on lending cost. For example, Meador
(1982) analyzes the effect of state foreclosure laws on mortgage
rates and ﬁnds that contract rates are generally higher in states
where the law extends the length and expense of the foreclosure
process. Clauretie and Thomas (1990) and Ciochetti (1997) docu-
ment greater lender costs in states that require judicial foreclo-
sure and statutory right of redemption. Lin and Michelle (2001) in-
vestigate the relationship between bankruptcy exemptions and the
availability of credit for mortgage and home improvement loans.
They ﬁnd that applicants are more likely to be turned down for
both types of loans when they live in states with unlimited rather
than low homestead exemptions. Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) , on
the other hand, show that in the 1990s high homestead exemp-
tion levels did not tend to increase mortgage rates or increase the
probability of being denied a mortgage. Pence (2006) examines the
effect of foreclosure laws on the size of approved mortgage loans
and ﬁnds that, everything else the same, lenders approve smaller
loans in default-friendly states. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the ﬁrst to evaluate the effect of a legislation change in
deﬁciency judgments. Our natural experiment provides variation in
deﬁciency, which allows cleaner identiﬁcation than the state-level
variation in existing recourse laws. The previous literature has typi-
cally used the latter approach; however, state recourse laws change
only infrequently. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the law change in Nevada and its potential impact
on debtors and creditors. Section 3 presents our data source.
Section 4 reports our empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Nevada deﬁciency judgment law 
2.1. The Nevada deﬁciency judgment law 
Until recently, Nevada was a recourse state, since it allowed
lenders to sue their borrowers to get a deﬁciency judgment
within six months following foreclosure for all mortgage loans.
The amount of the judgment, however, was limited to the lesser
of the difference between the total debt and fair market value of
the home, or the difference between the total debt and foreclo-
sure sale price. 5 Before awarding a deﬁciency judgment, the court
would hold a hearing to receive evidence from the lender and the
borrowers concerning the fair market value of the property as of
the date of the foreclosure sale. The lender must give the borrow-
ers notice of the hearing 15 days prior to the hearing. The court
would appoint an appraiser to appraise the property if the lender
or borrowers made a request at least 10 days before the hearing
date. 6 5 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.459. 
6 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.457. 
f
i
m
c
rThe deﬁciency lawsuit is similar to a lawsuit to recover an un-
ecured debt, such as credit card debt. If the lender wins the case,
he court will issue a judgment ordering the borrowers to pay off
he deﬁciency. If the borrowers ignore this court order, the lender
an use the deﬁciency judgment to place liens on other property
hat the borrowers own, garnish their wages, or freeze their bank
ccounts. In the Appendix, we provide information on the actual
ractice of deﬁciency judgment in Clark county, Nevada. 7 , 8 Based
n our collected data, the fraction of foreclosed loans that ended
p with a deﬁciency judgment has been declining over time, from
0 percent in 20 0 0 to 0.12 percent in 2013. 9 The sharpest decline
ccurred in 2007, coinciding with the onset of the mortgage crisis.
n contrast, the amount of awarded judgment as a fraction of mort-
age outstanding has been increasing over time, with the median
ncreasing from 9 percent in 20 0 0 to 15 percent in 2013. 
Since the mortgage crisis began in 2007, Nevada, like many
ther states, has begun to implement new laws to mitigate fore-
losures. In 2009, eight laws were passed in Nevada alone. Table 1
ummarizes the eight laws. As can be seen, almost all laws made
oreclosures more cumbersome and costly by either imposing ad-
itional regulatory procedures or assigning more rights to owners
r renters during a foreclosure. The only exception is Assembly Bill
AB) 140, which also increased owners’ and tenants’ responsibility
o maintain the property during the foreclosure sale. 
This paper concerns one of the most important new laws: AB
71. This bill made signiﬁcant changes to Nevada’s deﬁciency judg-
ent law. Under the new legislation, a ﬁnancial institution hold-
ng a residential mortgage may not be awarded a deﬁciency judg-
ent if the following four circumstances apply: the real property
s a single-family house owned by the debtor, the debtor used the
oney loaned from the bank to buy the house, the house was
wner occupied, and the loan was never reﬁnanced. What this
eans is that, for many homeowners who enter into a mortgage
n conjunction with a house purchased after October 1, 2009, their
ortgage lender will not be able to pursue a deﬁciency judgment
f the house is taken in a foreclosure. Rather, upon foreclosure,
he risk that the house has depreciated in value shifts back to the
ank. Mortgages that do not satisfy these conditions remain sub-
ect to the prior law. 10 
Nevada passed no other laws in 2010 (the 26th Special Session).
n the summer of 2011, to combat robo-signing, the Nevada legis-
ature passed a set of pre-foreclosure rules that essentially require
he big banks to prove their claim of title before the foreclosure
an take place (AB 273, AB 284, AB 388, and Senate Bill (SB) 414).
hese changes made the judicial foreclosure process more attrac-
ive to banks, as they allowed them to sidestep the new robo-oreclosure involves ﬁling a lawsuit to obtain a court order to seek foreclosure and 
s used when no power of sale is present in the mortgage. The borrower has 12 
onths after the foreclosure sale to redeem the property. When a power-of-sale 
lause exists in a mortgage or deed of trust, the nonjudicial process is used. Bor- 
owers have no right of redemption under the power of sale. 
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Table 1 
Major Nevada Foreclosure Laws enacted in 2009. This paper focuses on Bill AB 471: the most signiﬁcant 
in 2009. The source for the table comes from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/75th2009/Bills/AB . 
Bill # Signed Effective Summary 
AB 486 05/26 10/01 Adds a provision to the escrow law that an escrow agent 
or escrow agency may be required to pay restitution to a 
person who suffered an economic loss due to a violation of 
NRS or NAC 645A. 
AB 471 05/28 10/01 Provided that the court may not award a deﬁciency 
judgment to the creditor or the beneﬁciary of the 
deed of trust if the purchase mortgage is secured 
by a single-family primary residence and made 
on or after October 1,2009. 
AB 361 05/28 10/01 Provided that, under certain circumstances, a unit-owner’s 
association may enter the grounds of a vacant unit or a unit in 
foreclosure to abate a public nuisance or maintain the exterior 
of the unit. 
SB 128 05/28 07/01 Speciﬁes certain reporting requirements during a foreclosure 
proceeding and imposes a time frame of 30 days for 
reporting a foreclosure sale to the county. 
AB 149 05/29 07/01 Modiﬁes existing foreclosure law and establishes a state 
Foreclosure Mediation Program. Foreclosure proceedings 
will be halted while borrowers are pursuing mediation. 
AB 151 05/29 10/01 Requires mortgage loans to include the license number of the 
mortgage broker. 
AB 152 05/29 07/01 Modiﬁes deﬁnitions and established requirements for “loan 
modiﬁcation consultants,” such as licensing and certain fees 
for services relating to foreclosure. 
AB 140 06/09 07/01 and Establishes the rights and responsibilities of property owners 
10/01 and tenants during a foreclosure sale, including property 
maintenance. Imposes a $1,0 0 0 ﬁne per day for failing 
to maintain the property. 
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11 Only lenders not doing business in a metropolitan statistical area (e.g., small 
community banks) are exempt from reporting to HMDA. 
12 HMDA does not distinguish single-family properties from two- to four- family 
properties. igning law and to seek a deﬁciency judgment at the same time
n properties not covered by AB 471. 
As historical background, the wide adoption of restrictions on
eﬁciency judgments by states occurred during another foreclosure
risis: the Great Depression. Before the Great Depression, there
ere few restrictions on deﬁciency judgments. In most states and
erritories, lenders were free to pursue all the remedies concur-
ently and successively. By the end of the Great Depression, almost
ll states had a “fair market value” provision, which prevented
enders from bidding far less than the market value of the prop-
rty during a foreclosure sale. Many states went further and pro-
ibited deﬁciency judgments altogether. Up until recently, virtually
ll of the restrictions on deﬁciency judgments dated from the fore-
losure crisis of the Great Depression. See Ghent (2014) for a more
etailed discussion of the historical origins of U.S. mortgage laws. 
.2. The impact of deﬁciency judgments on mortgage credit 
If lenders are not allowed to collect on delinquent borrowers’
ther assets, they will be reluctant to foreclose on a house, es-
ecially when the foreclosure cost is high and the resale price is
ow, because there is no ﬁnancial gain from doing so. Furthermore,
f lenders perceive a rise in default probabilities as a result of the
limination of deﬁciency judgments, they will tighten their lending
tandards by lending to less risky borrowers, making smaller loans,
r lending at higher mortgage rates. In other words, the supply of
ortgage credit may be lower in defaulter-friendly states because
enders experience higher costs. 
By contrast, no deﬁciency judgments provide borrowers with
ealth insurance against negative shocks to house prices. If bor-
owers value this insurance, mortgage demand will be higher. Put
t simply, borrowers may decide to apply for mortgages in the ﬁrst
lace or to apply for larger loans since they do not risk losing their
ther assets in the event of foreclosure. Because of these offsetting
ffects on mortgage supply and demand, the net equilibrium effect
f deﬁciency judgments on mortgage credit is, a priori, ambiguous.. Data 
.1. Data sampling 
Our main data set is collected by the Home Mortgage Disclo-
ure Act (HMDA), which covers almost all U.S. mortgage applica-
ions as well as originations. It records each applicant’s ﬁnal sta-
us (denied, approved, or originated), the purpose of borrowing
e.g., home purchase, reﬁnancing, or home improvement), occu-
ancy type (e.g., primary residence, second home, or investment
ome), loan amount, race, sex, income, and lenders’ institutional
ategories. 11 The data are then merged with county-level monthly
nemployment rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
ics and a monthly zip-code-level House Price Index (HPI) avail-
ble from CoreLogic, Inc. When the zip-code-level HPI is not avail-
ble due to low transaction volume, we substitute a county-level
PI. When the county-level HPI is not available either, we use the
evada state HPI. 
For our benchmark, we restrict the sample to ﬁrst-lien purchase
r reﬁnance mortgage applications made in Nevada and collateral-
zed by one- to four- unit primary residences six months before
nd six months after October 2009, when the new law became ef-
ective. 12 By construction, our treatment group consists of purchase
oans while our control group consists of reﬁnance loans that are
ot affected by the law change. We then delete those applications
hat were withdrawn without an approval decision or were closed
or incompleteness. We also delete loans insured by the Federal
ousing Administration (FHA) and the U.S. Department of Veter-
ns Affairs (VA) from the sample because deﬁciency judgments are
rohibited on FHA loans and strongly discouraged on VA loans.
inally, we drop mortgage loans for manufacturing housing as in
4 W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 
Table 2 
Sample construction. This table describes the construction of our benchmark sample using 
HMDA. 
Notes: 1. There were no applications for multifamily dwellings during our sample period. 
2. The variable names in the parentheses are those used by HMDA. 
3. FSA/RHS stands for Farm Service Agency/Rural Housing Service, known as FmHA-insured 
(Farmers Home Administration) in 1998 and earlier collection years’ guidance. 
Selection criteria Sample size 
First lien loan applications made between 2009:04 and 2010:03 in Nevada 112,590 
– Application withdrawn, closed for incompleteness, preapproval request 15,914 
denied, preapproval request approved but not accepted (action_type > = 4) 
– Home improvement loan (loan_purpose = 2) 1,016 
– Occupancy not applicable (occupancy = 3) 257 
– Non-single family property (property_type = 2 or 3) 2,362 
– Gross annual income of applicants less than or equal to zero or missing 8,445 
– Loans guaranteed or insured by FHA, VA, FSA/RHS (loan_type = 2,3,4) 35,763 
– Not owner-occupied (occupancy = 2) 12,449 
Final sample 36,384 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Sample summary statistics. This table describes the data constructed in Table 2 : 
all Applications including those that will be later rejected for conventional ﬁrst-lien 
purchase or reﬁnance loans for owner-occupied one- to four- unit primary resi- 
dences submitted between April 2009 and March 2010. Notes: ∗ indicates dummy 
variables. 
Variable Mean Median S.D. 
Approval rate ∗ 0.722 1 0.448 
Purchase mortgage loans ∗ 0.332 0 0.471 
Purchase loans made after law change ∗ 0.147 0 0.354 
Gender: female ∗ 0.274 0 0.446 
Gender: unknown ∗ 0.065 0 0.247 
Race: black ∗ 0.022 0 0.147 
Race: nonwhite and nonblack ∗ 0.091 0 0.288 
Race: unknown ∗ 0.114 0 0.317 
With cosigner ∗ 0.524 1 0.499 
Income ($ thousands) 99 74 92 
Loan amount ($ thousands) 209 180 123 
Census tract % of population nonwhite 21 19 12 
and/or Hispanic or Latino 
Census tract median family income ($thousands) 65 64 18 
Census tract total population (thousands) 4.606 4.315 2.345 
Regulatory agency: 
Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ∗ 0.551 1 0.497 
Federal Reserve System (FRS) ∗ 0.019 0 0.137 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ∗ 0.025 0 0.155 
Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ∗ 0.087 0 0.281 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) ∗ 0.053 0 0.224 
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) ∗ 0.205 0 0.404 
Loans with private mortgage insurance (PMI) ∗ 0.060 0 0.237 
Lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.099 12.400 1.608 
Lagged net local house price growth rate (%) −0.884 −0.712 1.783 
Total number of observations 36,384 
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a  Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) . Table 2 reports in details the steps we
take to construct our benchmark sample Table A.1 . 
3.2. Background 
The U.S. housing market went through a drastic cycle beginning
in the late 1990s, with house prices growing signiﬁcantly between
1996 and 2006 and then crashing in 2007 before recovering be-
ginning in 2010. The cycle was particularly prominent in several
states including Nevada. As can be seen in Table A.2 in the Ap-
pendix, this cycle was also reﬂected in changing mortgage appli-
cations in Nevada. In 2004 and 2005, total mortgage applications
for ﬁrst-lien, owner-occupied, one- to four- unit primary residences
were more than 20 0,0 0 0 annually. They fell to the mid to low
10 0,0 0 0s in 2006 and 2007, and then to less than 100,000 starting
in 2008. The fraction of applications that were conventional (i.e.,
not insured by FHA , VA , or FmHa), dropped sharply from over 90
percent before 2007 to about 50 percent between 2009 and 2011.
Furthermore, the fraction of loans that were sold within the calen-
dar year to institutions (especially government institutions such as
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac) increased
steadily since the crisis began in 2007. Note that some of these
loans would end up being securized by the government agencies,
while others would stay on the balance sheets of their purchasers
such as commercial banks, savings banks or savings associations,
life insurance companies, and aﬃliate institutions. The private se-
curitization market dried up after 2007. 
One other major development in the mortgage market around
the time of our study is the introduction of the Home Afford-
able Reﬁnance Program (HARP) by the U.S. Department of Trea-
sury and the Federal Housing Finance Agency in March 2009. The
program instructed government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac) to provide credit guarantees on reﬁnances of
conforming mortgages, even in cases when the resulting loan-to-
value ratios exceeded the usual eligibility threshold of 80 percent.
HARP got off to a slow start, reﬁnancing only about 30 0,0 0 0 loans
nationwide during the ﬁrst full year of the program, which coin-
cides with the sample period of our study. However, there does
appear to be a small pickup toward the end of the ﬁrst year.
Table A.3 reports the monthly reﬁnancing volume by HARP. We
will conduct analysis to address the potential impact of HARP on
our analysis. 
3.3. Descriptive 
Turning to our sample, Table 3 reports summary statistics for
the benchmark sample. We winsorize income and loan amount at
98th percentile by setting the income/loan amount above the 99thercentile to its 99th percentile value and the income/loan amount
elow the 1st percentile to its 1st percentile value. For the six
onths before and six months after October 1, 2009, there are a
otal of 36,384 applications for ﬁrst-lien mortgages collateralized
y one- to four- family primary residences with no government
uarantees. The overall mortgage approval rate is 72 percent. Of
hese applications, 33 percent are for purchase and about 15 per-
ent are affected by the change in deﬁciency judgments (i.e., pur-
hase loan applications made after October 1, 2009). Roughly 27
ercent of the applications are ﬁled by women. About 78 percent
f the applicants are white, 2 percent are black, 9 percent list a
ace other than white or black, and 11 percent do not report race.
ore than half of the applications have cosigners, suggesting that
hese applicants are likely married. 
There exists signiﬁcant income disparity among the applicants,
ith the average (nominal) income at application at $99,0 0 0
nd the median income at $74,0 0 0. The average loan amount is
W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 5 
Table 4 
Sample summary statistics: purchase versus reﬁnance loans. This table presents, by loan purpose (purchase versus 
reﬁnance), the data constructed in Table 2 : all Applications including those that will be later rejected for conven- 
tional ﬁrst-lien purchase or reﬁnance loans for owner-occupied one- to four- unit primary residence submitted 
between April 2009 and March 2010. The purchase loans are our treatment group while the reﬁnance loans are 
our control group. Notes: ∗ indicates dummy variables. 
Variable Treatment Control 
(Purchase loans) (Reﬁnance loans) 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Approval rate ∗ 0.817 1 0387 0.674 1 0.469 
Gender: female ∗ 0.294 0 0.456 0.264 0 0.441 
Gender: unknown ∗ 0.049 0 0.216 0.073 0 0.261 
Race: black ∗ 0.021 0 0.144 0.022 0 0.148 
Race: nonwhite and nonblack ∗ 0.137 0 0.344 0.068 0 0.251 
Race: unknown ∗ 0.096 0 0.295 0.122 0 0.323 
With cosigner ∗ 0.394 0 0.489 0.589 1 0.492 
Income ($ thousands) 94 66 93 101 77 91 
Loan amount ($ thousands) 193 159 125 217 191 121 
Census tract % of population nonwhite 22 20 13 20 19 12 
and/or Hispanic or Latino 
Census tract median family income ($0 0 0) 64 63 18 66 64 17 
Census tract total population (thousands) 4.371 4.145 2.290 4.717 4.369 2.365 
Regulatory agency: 
OCC ∗ 0.396 0 0.489 0.628 1 0.483 
FRS ∗ 0.027 0 0.162 0.015 0 0.123 
FDIC ∗ 0.028 0 0.166 0.023 0 0.150 
OTS ∗ 0.079 0 0.270 0.090 0 0.287 
NCUA ∗ 0.047 0 0.211 0.056 0 0.230 
HUD ∗ 0.282 0 0.450 0.168 0 0.373 
Loans with Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI) ∗ 0.141 0 0.348 0.020 0 0.140 
Lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.315 12.500 1.505 11.990 12.100 1.647 
Lagged net local house price growth rate (%) −0.796 −0.439 1.824 −0.928 −0.712 1.761 
Total number of observations 12,084 24,300 
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s  209,0 0 0, and the median is $180,0 0 0. On average, about 21 per-
ent of the population are nonwhite and/or Hispanic or Latino in
ensus tracts where the applications are ﬁled. The average family
ncome of these census tracts is $65,0 0 0, far below the average
f the mortgage applicants, and the median is $64,0 0 0, also sig-
iﬁcantly below the median income of mortgage applicants. The
verage census tract population is about 4,600. Lenders of these
ortgages mostly come from institutions that are regulated by
he Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (55 percent),
ollowed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
HUD) (21 percent), the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (9 per-
ent), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (5 percent),
nd the Federal Reserve (2 percent). About 6 percent of the loans
ave private mortgage insurance. Unemployment rates are high in
ll counties of Nevada for the sample period, with both the mean
nd the median over 12 percent. House prices declined for most of
he state during that period at a monthly rate of 0.9 percent. 
Table 4 reports the same summary statistics for the purchase
oan (treatment group) and reﬁnance loan applications (control
roup) separately. The most noticeable difference is that loan ap-
roval rates are much higher for purchase loans than for reﬁ-
ance loans, 82 percent versus 67 percent. Other than that, pur-
hase loan applicants and reﬁnance loan applicants appear simi-
ar with only a few exceptions. First, reﬁnance applicants are more
ikely to have cosigners, 59 percent for reﬁnance loans versus 39
ercent for purchase loans. They also have slightly higher income
nd larger loans. Second, more of the reﬁnance loan lenders are
upervised by OCC, and fewer reﬁnance loans have private mort-
age insurance. Given that reﬁnance loans were originated at times
hen house prices were high, it is likely that reﬁnance loans have
 much higher mortgage loan-to-value ratio. Unfortunately, we doot observe house value from the data. s  
e  
l  . Results 
Fig. 1 charts the time trend in average approval rates and loan
izes for purchase and reﬁnance loans, respectively, for the time
eriod between January 2008 and December 2011. The approval
ates for purchase loans are fairly stable until the end of 2010
hen they begin to inch up. For approval rates for reﬁnance loans,
here is a sharp decline in the middle of 2008 followed by a sharp
ise in early 2009, coinciding with the introduction of HARP, which
as introduced by the government in March 2009. After that, the
pproval rates have been stable with a slight upward trend. The
oan sizes for purchase and reﬁnance loans have generally tracked
ach other during this period, with purchase loans slightly larger
han reﬁnance loans before 2009 and then slightly smaller than
eﬁnance loans after 2009. It is worth noting that for the six
onths before the law change (i.e., April 2009 to October 2009),
here do not appear to be signiﬁcant differential changes in the
pproval rates or approved loan sizes between the treatment (pur-
hase loans) and control groups (reﬁnance loans). This observation
ields support to the validity of our identiﬁcation assumption, that
s, in the absence of the legislative change, the approval rates and
pproved loan sizes in the control and treatment groups would fol-
ow similar patterns (up to a constant difference). 
Fig. 2 charts the raw data for average mortgage loan approval
ates and approved mortgage loan sizes as deviations from their
espective October 2009 levels. The left panel indicates that ap-
roval rates for purchase loans ﬂuctuate much more than loan ap-
roval rates for reﬁnance loans. Additionally, while average mort-
age loan approval rates do not appear to exhibit any trend for
urchase loans during the time period, they seem to increase
lightly for reﬁnance loans. In terms of approved mortgage loan
izes, leading to October 2009 when the new law takes effect, av-
rage loan sizes decline for both purchase loans and reﬁnanced
oans. More so for purchase loans. Though both loan sizes begin
6 W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 
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Fig. 1. Average approval rates and average loan sizes for approved mortgages (Source: HMDA. We restrict mortgages to ﬁrst-lien conventional loans that are for one- to four- 
family primary residences.). 
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a  to recover after the law change, the recovery comes a bit earlier
for reﬁnance loans than for purchase loans. 
4.1. Empirical methodology 
We analyze the response in mortgage loan approval rates and
approved loan sizes using a difference-in-differences methodology.
The treatment group corresponds to purchase loans that are sub-
ject to the law change, and the control group corresponds to re-
ﬁnance loans that are not affected by the law change. The pre-
treatment period is from 2009:04 to 2009:09 (six months), and the
post-treatment period is from 2009:10 to 2010:03 (six months). 
We study the average monthly response to the law change us-
ing the following speciﬁcation, 
 t = αZ t + βX t + ε t , (1)
where Y t is the variable of interest (approval rates or approved
loan sizes); Z t is the key interaction variable previously discussed,
purchased loans made after October 2009; and X t is a vector of
control variables, including gender, race, and income of the appli-
cant, whether the applicant has a cosigner for the mortgage, cen-
sus tract minority population, census tract median family income
and total population, and dummies for the various regulatory agen-
cies for the lender. We further control for county and month ﬁxed
effects and separate linear time trends for each county. Finally, we
cluster standard errors at the county level. 
The coeﬃcient α measures the effect of the change in the de-
ﬁciency law. As mentioned in the introduction, the identiﬁcation
of this coeﬃcient is based on the qualiﬁcation criteria associated
with the legislative change: the new law applies to single-family
ﬁrst-lien mortgages made after October 2009, and it applies to pur-
chase mortgages only. Speciﬁcally, when Nevada eliminated deﬁ-
ciency judgment for ﬁrst-lien purchase mortgages made for single-
family homes after October 2009, to study its effect we could sim-
ply subtract loan approval rates and approved loan sizes after Oc-ober 2009 from their respective levels before October 2009. How-
ver, contemporaneous changes in credit market conditions may
ave affected the approval rates and approved loan sizes for these
urchase loans. To help control for these changing economic con-
itions, we use the reﬁnance loans that are not affected by the leg-
slative change as our control group as these loans are exposed to
imilar credit market conditions. We can then compare the differ-
nce in approval rates and approved loan sizes for reﬁnance loans
efore and after October 2009 with the same difference for pur-
hase loans. The difference in these two differences would there-
ore serve as an estimate of the effect of the elimination of deﬁ-
iency judgment for purchase loans in Nevada. 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) when the dependent vari-
ble y t is continuous as is the case with approved mortgage loan
izes and probit regression when the dependent variable is binary
s is the case with mortgage approval rates. 
.2. Main results 
We report our regression results in Table 5 . According to our
nalyses, the key variable, one- to four- family purchase loans
ade after October 2009, contributes negatively and is statisti-
ally signiﬁcant to lenders’ approval rates as well as mortgage loan
izes upon approval. In particular, a one- to four- family mortgage
urchase loan made after October 2009 has an approval rate that
s 2.56 percentage points lower than that of a similar loan made
arlier or a single-family reﬁnance loan, that is, it is 3.16 percent
(2.56/81) ∗100) less likely to be approved. The approved loan size
s $2,500 less, or 1.30 percent ((2.5/193) ∗100) smaller than loans
ot affected by the change in the law. The change in equilibrium
oan sizes is smaller than the 4 to 6 percent decline in loan sizes in
tates with default-friendly foreclosure laws found in Pence (2006) .
In terms of the other control variables, for approval rates, every-
hing else the same, a purchase mortgage loan is about 16 percent-
ge points more likely to be approved. This result arises because
W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 7 
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Fig. 2. Deviations in average approval rates and average loan sizes for approved mortgages from their respective Oct. 2009 Levels (Source: HMDA. We restrict mortgages to 
ﬁrst-lien conventional loans that are for one- to four- family primary residences.). 
Table 5 
Mortgage lending: approval rates and approved loan sizes – benchmark (HMDA). This table presents 
estimates from regressions that track mortgage approval rates and approved loan sizes around the 
law change (April 2009 to March 2010). The dependent variable for the approval rate takes the value 
of 1 if the loan is approved and 0 otherwise. The approved loan sizes are in thousand dollars. ∗
indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 10 percent level, ∗∗ at 5 percent, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent. 
Dependent variable Mortgage approval rates Approved loan sizes 
(Probit, Marginal effect) (OLS) 
Independent variable Marginal coeff. S.E. Coeﬃcient S.E. 
Purchase loans made after reform −0.0256 ∗∗∗ 0.0077 −2.5262 ∗ 1.0208 
Purchase loan 0.1580 ∗∗∗ 0.0040 −2.8066 ∗ 1.9102 
Income at origination ($ thousands) 4.71e-05 ∗∗∗ 1.76e-05 0.7303 ∗∗∗ 0.0177 
Loan amount ($ thousands) −7.73e-04 ∗∗∗ 1.06e-05 
Have cosigner 5.37-02 ∗∗∗ 1.80-03 6.4798 ∗∗∗ 1.3430 
Race: black −0.0872 ∗∗∗ 0.0069 5.8633 ∗∗∗ 1.0228 
Race: other than white and black −0.0432 ∗∗∗ 0.0029 4.9496 ∗∗∗ 1.0773 
Race: unknown −0.0632 ∗∗∗ 0.0067 8.1649 ∗∗∗ 2.4679 
Gender: female −0.0152 ∗∗∗ 0.0055 −8.6664 ∗∗∗ 1.9792 
Gender: unknown 0.0140 0.0105 −5.7641 ∗∗∗ 1.7734 
Census tract % of population nonwhite −0.0036 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 03 −1.2153 ∗∗∗ 0.1150 
Census tract population 0.0039 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 09 0.5904 0.6925 
Census tract median family income 0.0023 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 02 1.0125 ∗∗∗ 0.1606 
Lender supervisor: OCC 0.0079 0.0119 1.6865 2.3351 
Lender supervisor: FRS 0.1025 ∗∗∗ 0.0207 4.8361 4.3473 
Lender supervisor: OTS −0.0165 0.0122 20.2405 ∗∗∗ 3.0311 
Lender supervisor: NUCA 0.1260 0.0164 −9.3316 ∗∗∗ 3.5456 
Lender supervisor: HUD 0.0290 ∗∗ 0.0130 8.7436 ∗∗∗ 2.9464 
Loans with PMI 0.0929 ∗∗∗ 0.0396 26.4033 ∗∗∗ 2.9909 
Lagged monthly unemployment rate 0.0146 0.0148 −3.7960 ∗∗ 1.7515 
Lagged HPI growth rate 0.2624 0.2212 −25.3170 60.3821 
Number of ﬁxed effects included 
Linear county time trends 17 17 
County ﬁxed effects 17 17 
Monthly ﬁxed effects 12 12 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0750 0.4769 
Number of observations 36,384 26,269 
8 W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 
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14 Indeed, we investigate a matched HMDA-LPS dataset. This dataset is proprietary 
and jointly owned by several Federal Reserve Banks. The match is conducted based 
on the following rules: origination date and action date are within ﬁve days of each 
other; origination amount must be within $500; property zip code must match; lien loans made earlier during housing booms are likely of lower stan-
dards and are thus less likely to be approved for reﬁnance, espe-
cially after house prices declined and lenders subsequently tight-
ened their lending standards. As expected, a high income increases
the probability of being approved, while a large loan amount re-
duces the probability of being approved. Speciﬁcally, a $1,0 0 0 in-
crease in income raises the approval rate by about 0.47 basis
points, while a $1,0 0 0 increase in loan amount reduces the ap-
proval rate by about 7.7 basis points. Having a cosigner increases
the loan approval rate by a substantial 5 percentage points. Being
a minority, black or nonblack as well as not reporting race leads
to lower loan approval rates than being white. Speciﬁcally, being
a nonhispanic white leads to a loan approval rate that is between
4 to 6 percentage points higher. This number is slightly smaller
than the ﬁndings in Munnell et al. (1996) . In their 1989 study of
mortgage lending in the Boston area, Munnell et al. (1996) ﬁnd
that there is a 6 percentage point difference in the approval rate of
white applicants and minority applicants. Being female also leads
to lower loan approval rates. Living in census tracts with more
nonwhite and nonhispanic minorities also lowers the loan approval
rates. 13 Living in more populated census tracts or census tracts
with higher median family income, by contrast, raises mortgage
approval rates. Finally, compared with commercial banks that are
supervised by the FDIC, lenders supervised by the Federal Reserve
and HUD are more likely to approve mortgage loans. Loans with
private mortgage insurances are also more likely approved. 
In terms of loan sizes, interestingly, purchase loans are on av-
erage $2,800 smaller, reﬂecting perhaps reduced house prices. Ap-
plicants with higher incomes borrow more; a $1,0 0 0 increase in
income corresponds to a $730 increase in loan sizes. Having loan
cosigners implies a loan that is $6,400 larger. While being a non-
white minority implies larger loan sizes, being a female implies
smaller mortgage sizes. Additionally, living in areas with higher
minority population leads to smaller mortgage loans, while living
in areas with higher median family income means larger loans.
Compared to loans from lending institutions that are supervised
by the FDIC, those supervised by OTS and HUD and those with
private mortgage insurances are all larger, while those extended
by institutions supervised by NUCA are smaller. Finally, high local
unemployment rates lead to smaller loan sizes. 
4.3. Robustness analyses 
4.3.1. The potential impact of HARP 
As discussed earlier, HARP was introduced in March 2009. Its
slow start and eventual pick up toward the end of the ﬁrst year
potentially biased our results because it artiﬁcially raised the ap-
proval rates of reﬁnance loans ( Table A.3 ). To qualify for HARP reﬁ-
nance before 2011, a loan has to satisfy the following requirements:
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac must own or guarantee the loans, the
current loan-to-value ratio must be greater than 80 percent but
less than 125 percent, and the borrower must be current on his or
her mortgage with no late payment over the last six months and
no more than one late payment over the last 12 months. Unfortu-
nately, we do not observe any information concerning the loan or
the borrower prior to the loan application. However, we do observe
whether the loan is sold to government agencies such as Fannie13 These ﬁndings pertain to the literature on discrimination in mortgage lending. 
Ladd (1998) reviews earlier studies that provide evidence of disparate treatment of 
minorities in terms of loan denial rates, loan default rates, and the possibility of 
geographic redlining. Ross and John (2002) also discuss mortgage-lending discrim- 
ination and weakness in the fair-lending enforcement system. Additionally, Apgar 
and Calder (2005) document the new form of discrimination in the increase in 
high-cost, inappropriate, or predatory mortgage loans in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods during the housing booms of the late 1990s to early 20 0 0s. 
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tae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac as well as non-
overnment entities such as commercial banks, savings banks or
avings associations, life insurance companies, and aﬃliate institu-
ions within the calendar year of the application. We thus explore
he heterogeneity in loan approval rates and approved loan sizes
ased on this information. There are, however, important caveats
ith this approach. Additional loans are sold after the calendar
ear. As a matter of fact, during the time period of our study,
ost of the loans would end up being purchased by Fannie Mae or
reddie Mac. 14 Those reﬁnance loans being recorded as purchased
arlier by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may not necessarily corre-
pond to HARP loans. As a matter of fact, many purchase loans are
lso invested by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac within the calendar
ear of their origination. 
Table A.4 in the Appendix provides the summary statistics for
pproved loans that are sold within the calendar year and ap-
roved loans that are not sold. There are only three noticeable dif-
erences between the two types of loans. First, more of the reﬁ-
ance loans are sold within the calendar year. Second, many more
oans sold within the calendar year come from lenders supervised
y HUD. Third, none of the loans sold have private mortgage in-
urance while 24 percent of the loans not sold have private mort-
age insurance. These differences are not surprising given that 68
ercent of the entities that bought in the secondary market are
overnment agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and
armer Mac), and, hence, no private mortgage insurance is re-
uired. Of the loans purchased by government agencies, 70 per-
ent are reﬁnance loans, while of those sold to nongovernment
gencies, only 57 percent are reﬁnance loans. This suggests some
mpact by government loan modiﬁcation program that came into
ffect in March 2009. We do not report separately the summary
tatistics for these two types of loans, purchased by government
ersus purchased by nongovernment agencies, as they remain sim-
lar in all other aspects. 
We report our regression results in Table 6 . When we restrict
ur sample to loans sold within the calendar year, it remains that
he purchase loans are $1,400 smaller after the law change; this
s slightly more than half of the decline in loan size we found
n the benchmark sample. The change in the deﬁciency law does
ot impact purchase loans if we study only loans sold to govern-
ent agencies within the calendar year. When we examine loans
ot sold within the calendar year, we ﬁnd that the change in the
aw reduces the mortgage approval rates by almost 8 percentage
oints; this is three times as large as the 2.5 percentage point drop
e ﬁnd in the benchmark. In terms of equilibrium loan sizes, the
ecline is $4,0 0 0, about $1,50 0 larger than the benchmark. Finally,
e delete from our benchmark sample conforming reﬁnance loans
loan amount less than $417,0 0 0) that are sold to Fannie Mae or
reddie Mac, assuming that all these loans are HARP loans. In row
 of Table 6 , we observe that the elimination of deﬁciency judg-
ent led to a 3.9 percentage point decrease in mortgage approval
ates, higher than the 2.56 percent we obtained using the bench-ypes if populated must match; loan purpose types if populated must match; and 
ccupancy types if populated must match. Applying the same criteria we used to 
onstruct the benchmark sample, the matched data yield 12,540 observations, less 
han half of those in the baseline. According to the matched data, at origination, 
8 percent of the loans are invested by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, 19 percent are 
rivately securitized, and 63 percent are portfolio loans. By month six after origina- 
ion, 93 percent of the loans are invested by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, 2 percent 
re securitized by private entities, and 4 percent remain on banks’ portfolios. Note 
hat these numbers do not correspond well with those reported by HMDA indi- 
ating perhaps HMDA captures ex-ante loan agreements (i.e., lenders already know 
hat the loans are earmarked for sale when making the loans). 
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Table 6 
Robustness analyses. This table presents the estimated coeﬃcient of the interaction variable: purchase 
loans made after October 2009 under different settings. The regression speciﬁcation follows that in the 
benchmark as speciﬁed in Table 5 . 
Notes: 1. Loans sold within the calendar year refer to originated loans being subsequently sold to sec- 
ondary market entities including Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, commercial banks, 
savings banks or savings associations, and life insurance companies. Some of the loans sold will stay on 
the purchasing institution’s balance sheets, and others will be securitized. Loans sold to government agen- 
cies are loans sold to Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac. 
2. Conforming loans are loans with balances below $417,0 0 0. 
3. For the alternative control group, we use counties on both sides of the Nevada border for the whole 
sample. Loan applications and approved loans on the other side of the Nevada border serve as the control 
group. See the main text for a list of counties included in this analysis. 
4. For the alternative sample, we use counties along the border of Nevada but exclude Nevada and assume 
that those counties had a similar law change in October 2009 for purchase loans. 
5. ∗ Statistical signiﬁcance for the estimate at 10 percent level, ∗∗ at 5 percent level, and ∗∗∗ at 1 percent 
level. 
Dependent variable Mortgage approval rates Approved loan size 
Coeﬃcient S.E. Obs. Coeﬃcient S.E. Obs. 
Benchmark −0.0256 ∗∗∗ 0.0077 36,384 −2.5262 ∗ 1.0208 26,269 
Heterogeneity 
Loans sold within the year −1.3663 ∗ 0.7643 18,512 
Loans sold to gov. agencies −2.2004 3.5265 12,498 
Loans not sold within the year −0.0794 ∗∗∗ 0.0057 17,872 −4.0624 ∗ 2.4412 7,757 
Excluding conventional reﬁ. −0.0391 ∗∗∗ 0.0070 31,560 0.0561 2.5139 21,445 
loans sold to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac 
Robustness Analyses 
Propensity Score Matching −0.0267 ∗∗∗ 0.0072 36,384 −2.6316 ∗∗∗ 0.6432 26,269 
Alternative control group 
OLS 0.0010 0.0118 27,836 −4.0364 ∗ 2.3682 23,129 
PSM technique −0.0 0 03 0.0111 27,836 −4.3746 ∗ 2.5125 23,129 
Alternative sample 
OLS −0.0156 0.0133 59,623 −3.0570 2.0043 45,647 
Propensity Score Matching −0.0289 0.0165 59,623 −1.8143 2.2311 45,647 
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h  ark sample. The average approved loan sizes, however, are no
onger signiﬁcantly impacted by the legislative change. These re-
ults indicate that the law change appears to have a much smaller
ffect on loans sold in the secondary market, especially to gov-
rnment agencies. This may be because the sold loans are either
f higher quality or enjoy some form of government support and,
hus, less likely to default and beneﬁt from the law change. 
.3.2. Robustness analyses 
We conduct several robustness analyses in this subsection. First,
e use an alternative propensity score matching technique for the
stimation. This technique attempts to reduce bias stemming from
he fact that the policy experiment is nonrandom (i.e., the law
hange applies to purchase loans only and purchase and reﬁnance
oans may be fundamentally different). Then we use an alternative
ontrol group to address the concern that, perhaps instead of the
reatment group, it is our choice of control group in the benchmark
hat is responsible for the results. This also relates to the concern
f the potential impact of HARP in driving our baseline results. Fi-
ally, we conduct a placebo test using other states that did not
ave such a change in deﬁciency judgment laws. The results for
hese analyses are reported in Table 6 . 
Propensity score matching. What PSM does is to ﬁrst run a pro-
it or logit regression over the entire sample explaining which ob-
ervations are treated, using as control variables only the loan-
peciﬁc variables given in Table 5 , except for loan amount. A
ropensity score is then constructed based on the regression. Using
he computed score for each observation as a weight, we run the
econd stage regressions explaining mortgage approval rates and
pproved mortgage loan sizes following the speciﬁcation given in
able 5 . This technique has been widely used in the literature in-
luding in, among many others, Agarwal and Qian (2014) and Elul
2016) . As can be seen in Table 6 , the results are not much differ-
nt from the benchmark analysis. This is not surprising given theimilarity between applicants for purchase loans and applicants for
eﬁnance loans reported in Table 4 . 
Alternative control group. To deal with the concern that the re-
uction in loan approval rates and approved mortgage loan sizes
re driven by reﬁnance loans, we construct a new sample. In the
ample, we include all ﬁrst-lien purchase mortgages made in coun-
ies on both sides of the border of Nevada. These counties include
ohave in Arizona; Alpine, Inyo, Lassen, Mono, Nevada, Placer,
an Bernardino and Sierra in California; Cassia, Owyhee, and Twin
alls in Idaho; Harney, Lake, and Malheur in Oregon; Carson City,
lark, Douglas, Elko, Esmeralda, Humboldt, Lincoln, Lyon, Mineral,
ye, Washoe, and White Pine in Nevada; and Beaver, Box Elder,
ron, Juab, Millard, Tooele, and Washington in Utah. There were no
hanges in deﬁciency or foreclosure-related laws during the sam-
le period for these states other than Nevada. 
As in the benchmark, we restrict our sample to nonmanufac-
uring housing loans not insured by the FHA or VA. In this new
ample, our treatment group remains the same as before (pur-
hase loans made in Nevada) but the control group consists now
f purchase loans made in those other counties. In Table A.5 ,
e report the summary statistics of this new sample. Comparing
able A.5 with Table 4 , we see that purchase loans made in states
hat border Nevada (the new control group) are more similar to
he purchase loans made in Nevada (the treatment group) than re-
nance loans made in Nevada during the same period in several
spects. They have more similar loan approval rates, fraction of
orrowers with cosigners, fraction of loans coming from lenders
nder the supervision of the OCC, and fraction of loans having
rivate mortgage insurance. However, loan amounts are less sim-
lar. The census tracts are also less alike in all three dimensions:
edian family income, total population, and minority population.
n terms of regression results, according to Table 6 , we no longer
ave any statistically signiﬁcant results with respect to loan ap-
10 W. Li, F. Oswald / Journal of Urban Economics 101 (2017) 1–13 
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thors. 
15 We thank Yuan Yuan for generously providing us with the information and 
technique for collecting this information. proval rates using either the whole sample or the PSM matched
sample. However, we continue to observe that mortgage loan sizes
are smaller in Nevada after the law change by about $4,0 0 0, or 2
(4/208 ∗100) percent. 
Alternative sample. Finally, we conduct a placebo test using
purchase as well as reﬁnance mortgage applications made in the
counties that border Nevada. We pretend that there is a similar
change in deﬁciency judgments in October 2009 that affects only
purchase mortgage loans and test whether that impacted loan ap-
proval rates and loan sizes for purchase loans. 
We report the summary statistics of the new sample in
Table A.6 . Compared to the benchmark sample, we have far more
reﬁnance loans than purchase loans, and the two types of loans
seem to be more similar than they are in the benchmark sample.
For example, although the approval rates for reﬁnance loans on
average are still smaller than those for purchase loans, the differ-
ences are smaller than those in the benchmark sample. The differ-
ences in loan amounts between purchase loans and reﬁnance loans
are also smaller in this alternative sample than those in the bench-
mark sample. We report the regression results in the last two rows
of Table 6 , and it appears that the pretended law change does not
affect the approval rates nor the approved loan sizes of purchase
loans any differently than they affect those of reﬁnance loans. 
4.3.3. Discussion 
Our benchmark as well as robustness analyses suggest that
changes in the deﬁciency judgments reduced loan sizes of ap-
proved mortgages and this result is robust to alternative construc-
tion of the control group or estimation technique. Although the
benchmark analysis also indicates that loan approval rates also de-
clined after the law change for the purchase loans, this result is
less robust to alternative construction of the control group. 
Several factors may contribute to the result of reduced equilib-
rium loan sizes. Lenders may respond to the higher costs intro-
duced by the new deﬁciency judgments by reducing the supply of
credit. For example, lenders may have tightened their lending stan-
dards by asking for more down payment or charging higher inter-
est rates. The smaller loan sizes may also reﬂect declining house
prices if the zip code house price index included in the analysis
is not an adequate proxy for individual property values. It is also
possible that households applying after the law change are more
prudent despite the fact that the new law has made foreclosure
less costly. 
Although it is not possible to give our result a clean interpreta-
tion, it is clear that the mortgage market reached a different equi-
librium for purchase loans after the law change, that is, borrowers
take out smaller loans. Although this is an indication of the higher
cost of borrowing, this result doesn’t necessarily imply that bor-
rowers are worse off as they now enjoy greater insurance provided
by the new law. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper studies whether the change in deﬁciency judgments
that affected only purchase mortgages made on single-family pri-
mary residences after October 2009 in the state of Nevada had any
effect on equilibrium mortgage approval rates and loan sizes. In
doing so, the paper makes a contribution to several strands of liter-
ature that seek to understand the relationship between real estate
laws and lending cost. 
Given that the law change in Nevada does not affect reﬁnance
loans, using a difference-in-differences identiﬁcation, the paper
ﬁnds evidence that approved mortgage sizes are smaller for pur-
chase loans after the law change. There is also evidence that ap-
proval rates have also declined for purchase mortgages after the
law change. We ﬁnd the negative effect on loan sizes after the lawhange is robust to alternative choice of control group: purchase
oans made in counties that border Nevada that did not experience
ny changes in deﬁciency judgment laws. However, the results on
pproval rates are not robust to this alternative sample construc-
ion. 
Overall, the results in this paper seem to corroborate the ex-
sting evidence in the literature, that is, borrowers in states with
efault-friendly laws face a reduced supply of mortgage credit. The
aper, however, does not address the issue that perhaps even at
his price, borrowers in those states may still beneﬁt from the in-
reased insurance provided by generous foreclosure laws. Such a
elfare analysis requires more structural approach, which we leave
o future research. 
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ppendix 
We collect information on deﬁciency judgment cases for Clark
ounty, Nevada. 15 We ﬁrst obtain a list of lender names from
MDA for the years 20 0 0 to 2011. In total, we have 460 lenders,
ncluding prominent names such as Bank of America, Bank One,
hase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Countrywide Home Loans, GMAC
ank, Merrill Lynch Credit Corporation, and Wells Fargo. There are
lso many local smaller lenders. We built a Python web scraper
hat automates the following procedure to collect data from the
ourt website. The web scraper is publicly available on GitHub
t https://github.com/ﬂoswald/scraper . The search proceeds as fol-
ows: 
1. Go to the Clark County court records at https://lvjcpa.
clarkcountynv.gov/Anonymous/default.aspx . 
2. Select “District Civil/Criminal Records.”
3. On the next page, select “party” from the “Search By:” drop-
down menu. In the box with “Party Information:,” select “Busi-
ness” under “∗Business Name” and enter the lender names that
we obtained from HMDA as described above. In the box with
“Case Status,” choose “All” for “Date Filed:” and search for cases
ﬁled after 20 0 0 but before 2014. Click “search.”
4. In the resulting page, pick all cases that have “Breach of Con-
tract” under “ Type/Status.”
5. For each breach of contract click the case number to access the
court ﬁles. 
6. Check whether the court ruling is one of “DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT,” “DFLT JDGMT,” “DFLT JMNT,” “JUDGMENT PLUS INTER-
EST,” “DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST,” “DEFAULT JUDG
+ INT,” “DEFAULT JUDGMT + INT,” “JUDGMENT PLUS LEGAL
INTEREST,” “DEFAULT JMNT + INTEREST,” “DFLT JMNT+LEGAL,”
“DFLT JDGMT+INTEREST.” Information on amount awarded, at-
torney cost, and so on are collected from this page. 
7. The resulting data set is available upon request from the au-
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Table A.1 
Deﬁciency Judgments in Clark County, Nevada (20 0 0 - 2013). The sample for loans in foreclo- 
sure sales comes from LPS Applied Analytics. It includes mortgages that are real-estate owned, 
in liquidation, or in foreclosure sales. The sample for loans with deﬁciency judgments is col- 
lected from the county court as described in the Appendix. 
Notes. 1. The numbers inside the parentheses in column 4 are the percentage of loans in fore- 
closure that ended up in deﬁciency judgment court (column 4/column 2). 
2. The numbers inside the parentheses in column 5 are awarded deﬁciency judgments as 
shares of mortgage outstanding (column 5/column 3). 
Year Loans in foreclosure sales Loans with deﬁciency judgments 
Number Median balance ($) Number Median awarded judgments ($) 
20 0 0 881 111,477 174 (20%) 10,471 (9.4%) 
2001 651 114,788 132 (20%) 9,649 (8.4%) 
2002 700 118,679 96 (14%) 10,853 (9.1%) 
2003 663 115,828 99 (15%) 9,491 (8.2%) 
2004 586 104,729 91 (5%) 10,034 (9.6%) 
2005 1330 169,782 72 (3%) 12,577 (7.4%) 
2006 3891 237,125 111 (0.62%) 13,4 4 4 (5.7%) 
2007 13670 251,674 83 (0.09%) 15,602 (6.2%) 
2008 35680 241,692 32 (0.13%) 20,145 (8.3%) 
2009 51831 235,015 69 (0.18%) 17,854 (7.6%) 
2010 37167 220,986 67 (0.12%) 32,016 (14.5%) 
2011 23694 219,907 28 (0.11%) 42,867 (19.5%) 
2012 12332 208,913 13 (0.10%) 16,111 (7.7%) 
2013 5915 203,341 6 (0.12%) 26,369 (14.7%) 
Table A.2 
Mortgage loan applications and originations in Nevada (2004–2014). This table reports all applica- 
tions of ﬁrst-lien purchase or reﬁnance mortgages for owner-occupied one- to four- family units 
in Nevada from 2004 to 2014 according to HMDA. 
Notes. 1. The numbers in the parentheses in column 6 are the percentage of total approved loans 
that are sold to Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac. The difference of the two 
numbers is the percentage of loans sold to commercial banks, savings bank or savings association, 
life insurance company, aﬃliate institution, and other types of purchasers. 
Year Total % of purchase % approved % conventional % approved loans 
applications loans loan loans sold within the 
calendar year 
2004 213,271 41.4 78.6 96.6 68.7 (17.9) 
2005 216,770 43.1 76.5 98.4 73.6 (12.9) 
2006 175,343 43.1 72.3 98.5 68.9 (11.0) 
2007 129,395 36.9 64.1 95.7 64.8 (17.8) 
2008 80,743 52.4 65.5 64.7 75.6 (30.1) 
2009 75,562 56.9 74.5 50.7 82.1 (32.6) 
2010 57,565 59.8 78.5 50.5 82.5 (30.4) 
2011 47,823 62.3 80.3 52.5 80.0 (30.7) 
2012 77,829 38.8 81.0 69.7 84.2 (44.9) 
2013 71,881 42.9 82.7 70.4 82.4 (46.6) 
2014 59,979 57.8 81.1 61.5 81.2 (44.8) 
Table A.3 
HARP reﬁnance volume. This table reports the number of loans in thousands reﬁnanced 
through HARP by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The data source is Foreclosure Pre- 
vention and Reﬁnance Report, Third Quarter 2010, http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ 
ReportDocuments/20103Q _ FPR _ 508.pdf . Eligibility requirements prior to December 2011: 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac must own or guarantee the loan; the current loan-to-value ratio 
is greater than 80 percent but less than 125 percent; and the borrower must be current on 
his or her mortgage with no late payments over the last 6 months and no more than one 
late payment over the last 12 months. 
Month Loans modiﬁed under HARP (thousands) 
April 2009 2 
May 2009 6 
June 2009 23 
July 2009 31 
August 2009 32 
September 2009 24 
October 2009 18 
November 2009 21 
December 2009 34 
January 2010 32 
February 2010 35 
March 2010 35 
April 2010 30 
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Table A.4 
Summary statistics: approved loans sold within the calendar years versus loans not sold. This table reports summary 
statistics of approved purchase mortgages or reﬁnance conventional ﬁrst-lien mortgages for one- to four- family pri- 
mary residences by their investment status within the calendar year of the approval date. ∗indicates dummy variables. 
Variable Approved loans sold Approved loans not sold 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Purchase loans ∗ 0.344 0 0.489 0.452 0 0.500 
Gender: female ∗ 0.265 0 0.441 0.275 0 0.447 
Gender: unknown ∗ 0.052 0 0.223 0.082 0 0.274 
Race: black ∗ 0.086 0 0.281 0.019 0 0.289 
Race: nonwhite and nonblack ∗ 0.093 0 0.290 0.092 0 0.289 
Race: unknown ∗ 0.052 0 0.223 0.134 0 0.340 
With cosigner ∗ 0.552 1 0.497 0.498 0 0.500 
Income ($ thousands) 92 72 77 114 78 115 
Loan amount ($ thousands) 192 172 96 224 183 152 
Census tract % of population nonwhite 19 18 11 21 19 12 
and/or Hispanic or Latino 
Census tract median family income ($thousands) 66 64 17 66 64 19 
Census tract total population (thousands) 4.648 4.302 2.365 4.537 4.328 4.887 
Regulatory agency: 
OCC ∗ 0.561 1 0.496 0.468 0 0.500 
FRS ∗ 0.025 0 0.156 0.014 0 0.107 
FDIC ∗ 0.021 0 0.145 0.030 0 0.171 
OTS ∗ 0.072 0 0.256 0.099 0 0.298 
NCUA ∗ 0.061 0 0.240 0.061 0 0.239 
HUD ∗ 0.260 0 0.438 0.093 0 0.290 
Loans with PMI ∗ 0 0 0 0.235 0 0.424 
Lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.089 12.400 1.624 12.123 12.400 1.566 
Lagged net local house price growth rate (%) −0.835 −0.564 0.017 −0.910 −0.712 0.018 
Total number of observations 18,512 7,750 
Table A.5 
Summary statistics: using purchase loans from neighboring states as controls. This table reports the summary statis- 
tics of the alternative sample where we use purchase loans from neighboring counties as the control group. See the 
text for the list of the county names. ∗indicates dummy variables. 
Variable Nevada purchase loans Other purchase loans 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Approval rate ∗ 0.817 1 0.387 0.844 1 0.365 
Gender: female ∗ 0.295 0 0.456 0.264 0 0.441 
Gender: unknown ∗ 0.049 0 0.216 0.052 0 0.222 
Race: black ∗ 0.021 0 0.144 0.014 0 0.115 
Race: nonwhite and non-black ∗ 0.138 0 0.344 0.151 0 0.358 
Race: unknown ∗ 0.096 0 0.295 0.116 0 0.321 
With cosigner ∗ 0.393 0 0.488 0.451 1 0.498 
Income ($ thousands) 94 66 93 91 70 77 
Loan amount ($ thousands) 199 155 159 234 207 145 
Census tract % of population nonwhite 22 20 13 33 22 25 
and/or Hispanic or Latino 
Census tract median family income ($thousands) 64 63 18 58 56 21 
Census tract total population (thousands) 4.368 4.145 2.291 8.009 6.496 4.887 
Regulatory agency: 
OCC ∗ 0.397 0 0.489 0.330 1 0.470 
FRS ∗ 0.027 0 0.162 0.012 0 0.107 
FDIC ∗ 0.028 0 0.166 0.050 0 0.217 
OTS ∗ 0.079 0 0.270 0.079 0 0.270 
NCUA ∗ 0.046 0 0.211 0.033 0 0.178 
HUD ∗ 0.282 0 0.450 0.364 0 0.481 
Loans with PMI ∗ 0.141 0 0.348 0.133 0 0.339 
Lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.327 12.500 1.491 12.037 12.0 0 0 2.108 
Lagged net local house price growth rate (%) −1.418 −1.279 1.022 −0.418 −0.232 1.079 
Total number of observations 12,004 15,832 
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Table A.6 
Robustness analysis 2: using purchase and reﬁnance loans from neighboring states. This table reports the summary 
statistics for the sample used in the placebo analysis where the data contain all applications including those that 
will be later rejected for conventional ﬁrst-lien purchase or reﬁnance loans for owner-occupied one- to four- unit 
primary residences submitted between April 2009 and March 2010 in counties neighboring Nevada. See the main 
text of for the list of the county names. We test whether loans made in these counties exhibit similar patterns as 
those in the benchmark sample. ∗indicates dummy variables.. 
Variable Purchase loans Reﬁnance Loans 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
Approval rate ∗ 0.844 1 0.365 0.745 1 0.435 
Gender: female ∗ 0.264 0 0.441 0.220 0 0.414 
Gender: unknown ∗ 0.052 0 0.222 0.076 0 0.265 
Race: black ∗ 0.014 0 0.115 0.014 0 0.119 
Race: nonwhite and non-black ∗ 0.151 0 0.358 0.059 0 0.236 
Race: unknown ∗ 0.116 0 0.321 0.154 0 0.361 
With cosigner ∗ 0.451 1 0.498 0.637 1 0.481 
Income ($ thousands) 91 70 77 96 79 71 
Loan amount ($ thousands) 234 207 145 236 218 124 
Census tract % of population nonwhite 33 22 25 24 15 20 
and/or Hispanic or Latino 
Census tract median family income ($thousands) 58 56 21 60 57 20 
Census tract total population (thousands) 8.009 6.496 4.887 7.069 6.090 3.966 
Regulatory agency: 
OCC ∗ 0.330 1 0.470 0.511 1 0.500 
FRS ∗ 0.012 0 0.107 0.015 0 0.122 
FDIC ∗ 0.050 0 0.217 0.061 0 0.238 
OTS ∗ 0.079 0 0.270 0.108 0 0.311 
NCUA ∗ 0.033 0 0.178 0.056 0 0.229 
HUD ∗ 0.364 0 0.481 0.227 0 0.419 
Loans with PMI ∗ 0.133 0 0.339 0.022 0 0.148 
Lagged local unemployment rate (%) 12.037 12.0 0 0 2.108 11.408 2.291 2.291 
Lagged net local house price growth rate −0.418 −0.232 1.079 −0.500 −0.480 1.127 
Total number of observations 14,597 45,036 
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